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1 After three decades of multiparty elections in Africa, there are now many studies on
electoral  participation  in  the  continent.  A  more  recent  study  talks  about  “184
multicandidate presidential elections and 207 multiparty legislative elections held in
some forty-six [African] countries between 1990 and 2015” (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019,
p. 30). But how electoral participation is dealt with in the scholarly work varies from
study to study. Too often scholars refer to electoral participation as the act of voting.
However, casting a vote on election day is only one aspect of it (Bennett & Bennett,
1986). 
2 By definition the broader concept of political participation, which includes electoral
participation,  consists  of  “legal  activities  by  private  citizens  that  are  more  or  less
directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and the actions
they take” (Verba et al., 1978, p. 46). It is a multidimensional concept encompassing
many  indicators.  It  includes,  among  other  things,  collective  actions  around  policy
issues, contacting political representatives, and outbursts of street protests (Bennett &
Bennett, 1986). Dalton (2002) points out three modes of political participation: voting,
campaign activity and community activity. Verba et al. (1978, p. 55) add to that two
other modes of participation: contacting officials and protesting. Bratton et al. (2005)
indicate  the  following  forms  of  political  participation:  voting,  attending  election
campaign, working for a candidate, attending a community meeting, joining lobbying
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effort,  attending  a  demonstration,  writing  a  letter,  contacting  leaders  and  group
membership. 
3 These dimensions of political participation can be clustered into three subsets. The first
subset  is  of  participation  after  election.  It  includes  attending  a  community  meeting
referred to as community activity in Dalton (2002), joining a lobbying effort, attending
a demonstration, writing a letter, contacting leaders, and affiliating in a community or
developmental group. The second is participation on election day – that is, voting. And the
third is participation before election day – that is, campaign activity, specified in Bratton
et al. (2005) as attending an election campaign and working for a candidate. But this
dimension also includes voter registration – that is, “a gateway to enfranchisement”
(Pintor & Gratschew, 2002). 
4 This  study focuses  on political  participation in  a  multidimensional  perspective.  But
instead of using the broader concept of political participation, it focuses on two subsets
of  it:  participation  before  election  day and  participation  on  election  day.  The
combination of the two subsets can be named “electoral participation” and defined as:
the act of participating in an election commencing from election registration to voting
on election day. We measure electoral participation in this study by using data from the
Afrobarometer public opinion surveys1. 
5 Of  the  two  most  recent  Afrobarometer  surveys,  Round  6  (2014-2015)  and  Round  7
(2016-2018), Round 6 is more equipped with information on the different dimensions of
electoral  participation.  It  includes  five  items  of  electoral  participation  (i.e.  voting,
attending an election campaign rally,  working for a party or candidate, attending a
campaign meeting, and trying to persuade others to vote for your party or candidate).
Round 7 only includes the first three. In this study we employ the most recent Round 7
data.  Whilst  we  are  aware  of  its  limitation  tapping  the  concept  of  electoral
participation, our choice is mainly driven by one of its predictors, electoral violence, on
which items are mainly found in Round 72. 
6 The  first  objective  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  effect  of  electoral  violence  on
electoral participation. Studying electoral violence is relevant as it affects democratic
consolidation  (Bleck  &  van  de  Walle,  2019;  Burchard,  2015).  When  elections  are
characterized by the malpractice of election violence the system support tends to be
low in that voters tend to lose confidence in the legislature and government and they
are less likely to be satisfied with democracy and to obey the law (Norris, 2014, p. 129).
7 Violence has been significant in African elections. Of the several hundred competitive
legislative and presidential elections that have been held in Africa since 1990 (Bleck &
van de Walle, 2019) about 25 percent have been violent (Fisher, 2002; Straus & Taylor,
2012). Violence has been part of elections in Nigeria (Bratton, 2013; Sisk, 2012), Côte
d’Ivoire (Boone & Kriger,  2012),  Sudan (Sisk,  2012),  Kenya (Burchard, 2015;  Mueller,
2012), Ethiopia (Smith, 2012), Zimbabwe (Boone & Kriger, 2012; Bratton, 2015), Uganda
(Blattman, 2009), Togo and Zanzibar (Boeke, 2012); and more recently in Zambia in 2016
(Bleck & van de Walle, 2019, p. 1; Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018, p. 122) and Mozambique in
2019 (Shenga & Howe, forthcoming). 
8 The studies of the effect of electoral violence on electoral participation are limited in
Africa, as electoral violence is a relatively recent phenomenon (Burchard, 2015). As is
shown under the literature review section, there are at least two systematic studies of
the effect of electoral violence on electoral participation in Africa: one by Burchard
(2015)  and  the  other  by  Bratton  (2013).  Whilst  they  found  a  negative  relationship
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between the former and the later, these studies are limited in the way they measure
these  concepts.  Both  Bratton  (2013)  and  Burchard  (2015)  measure  electoral
participation only by voting; and electoral violence only by threats of violence at the
polls. 
9 Based on these previous  African studies  (Bratton,  2013;  Burchard,  2015)  and Norris
(2014), this study also expects to find a negative impact of election violence on electoral
participation. With less experience of alternation of power and some predominance of
dominant parties, we argue that in Africa electoral violence is used by the incumbent
parties to prevent the opposition supporters from turning out (Hafner-Burton et al.,
2014). 
10 This study contributes to the literature by testing this electoral violence theory using
multiple  dimensions  of  electoral  participation  and  electoral  violence.  This  study
enlarges the scope of measurement of electoral violence by including two measures:
fear of  violence in an election campaign and fear of  violence at  a  political  rally  or
campaign event. 
11 The second objective is to investigate the implications of the quality of elections for
democratic consolidation. The quality of elections is a multidimensional concept that
include  electoral  malpractice  (including  electoral  violence)  and  electoral  integrity
(Norris, 2014). When elections are violent they are characterized by a malpractice and
are of  low quality.  In  the first  objective  we are  concerned with the  malpractice  of
electoral violence per se, as it is a relatively new phenomenon in Africa with limited
studies on it, but in the second, instead of being minimalist on the concept of electoral
malpractice, we broaden and expand it. In doing so, we look at the whole package that
includes electoral malpractice and electoral integrity to represent it as the quality of
elections.  Elections  are  of  high  quality  if  they  are  of  low  malpractice  and  of  high
integrity. 
12 We  expect  to  find  a  positive  relationship  of  electoral  integrity  with  democratic
consolidation;  and  a  negative  connection  of  electoral  malpractice  with  democratic
consolidation,  as  Norris  (2014)  findings.  Greenberg  and  Mattes  (2013)  also  found  a
positive  association  between  the  quality  of  elections  and  supply  of  democracy.
Greenberg and Mattes (2013) measured the quality of elections using only a single item
of  electoral  integrity  –  that  is,  free  and  fair  elections.  Norris  (2014)  used  multiple
indicators for both electoral malpractice and electoral integrity but on the malpractice
of electoral violence used only one: threats of violence at the polls.
 
Literature review
13 Electoral violence affects electoral participation. Systematic studies of the impact of
electoral violence on electoral participation show a negative association between the
two.  A  cross-sectional  study  revealed  that  voters  who  have  experienced threats  of
election violence at the polls were less likely to vote in Nigeria (Bratton, 2013, p. 129). A
cross-national study also found the same globally (Norris, 2014, p. 143). In this case, it
can  be  argued  that  electoral  violence  is  used  by  the  incumbent  to  prevent  the
opposition supporters from turning out (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014). 
14 Another  cross-national  study  showed that  “electoral  violence  affects  willingness  to
[not] vote, but this effect differs by partisan attachment and specific electoral context”
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(Burchard,  2015,  p.  143).  In  cases  where  opposition  supporters  were  exposed  to
electoral violence they were more willing to vote. Although not significant, in cases
where the incumbent supporters were exposed to violence they were less likely to vote
(Burchard,  2015,  p.  139).  Depending  on  the  type  of  violence  (whether  strategic  or
incidental,  the  identity  of  the  perpetrators  and or  the  message that  it  is  meant  to
convey to voters) and how it affects directly individuals, electoral violence can be used
to mobilize voters to vote (see Travaglianti, 2014), to prevent them to turnout or to
punish victors (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017; Burchard, 2015). 
15 These studies measured electoral violence and electoral participation only by single
items.  Burchard (2015)  and Bratton (2013)  measured electoral  violence by threat  of
violence at  the polls.  Norris  (2014)  did the same but  her  measurement of  electoral
violence was integrated in the scope of an electoral malpractice index together with
other  items.  On  electoral  participation,  they  measured  it  by  voting  participation
(Bratton, 2015; Burchard, 2015; Norris, 2014). 
16 The quality of elections, in general, has an impact on electoral participation. “Elections
work well [when] they can provide the main opportunity for most people to participate
in politics” (Powell, 2000). Norris (2014) found that voter turnout tended to be high
when there was electoral integrity – that is, when votes were counted fairly, elections
were fair, voters were offered genuine choice in the elections and journalists provided
fair coverage of elections. It tended to be low when there was electoral malpractice, for
example, rich people bought elections, television news favoured the governing party,
voters were bribed,  opposition candidates were prevented from running and voters
were threatened with violence at the polls (p. 143). 
17 Norris  (2014)  notes  that  “too  often  elections  around  the  globe  are  deeply  flawed”
meaning that they do not have integrity. In Africa the scenario is also of concern. As
Bleck and van de Walle (2019) described it: “extensive intimidation of the opposition”
and  suspension  of  the  opposition  newspaper  took  place,  respectively,  in  the  2016
Gambian and Zambian elections (pp. 2-3). Districts were gerrymandered in Zimbabwe
ahead of the 2008 election (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018, p. 41); and candidates in Nigeria,
Uganda, Ghana and Kenya were found to distribute largesse and buy votes (Cheeseman
& Klaas, 2018, pp. 61-92). 
18 Performance evaluation (of institutional actors, such as: the incumbent or opposition
parties and individual actors like the incumbent or opposition candidates) affect voting
behaviour. It is based on rational choice theory that assumes that voters
act rationally – that is,  before deciding on a course of  action (such as buying a
particular product) they weigh up the costs and benefits of the various alternatives
and they will take the decision which maximizes the benefits and minimizes the
costs to themselves. (Denver, 2007)
19 Thus, voters vote and make a party choice based on the performance evaluation they
make of political parties and candidates by looking at current political issues, campaign
events and personalities of party leaders or candidates. 
20 Bratton et al. (2005) found a negative relationship between performance evaluation of
the president and voting. But Bratton et al. (2013) discovered a positive connection of
prospective sociotropic economic evaluation and economic policy performance with an
intention  to  vote  for  the  ruling  party  (p.  92). In  the  African  context  of  electoral
violence, Collier and Vicente (2012) found that voters that were exposed to violence
and were the targets of an institutional actor (ActionAid International Nigeria’s anti-
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violence campaign) were more likely to vote than others. As is shown later in this study
we analyse the effect of evaluation of government performance on election violence. 
21 Electoral participation can be also predicted from the habit of participating in politics 
in general.  Bratton et  al.  (2005)  found that the act  of  participating in politics  after
elections by contacting and communing led Africans to participate on election day and
even in  other  forms of  political  participation  like  protesting.  They  also  found that
participating on election day led voters to contacting and communing (Bratton et al.,
2005,  p.  297).  Bechtel et al.  (2018) found that the long-term and spillover effects of
compulsory voting in the Swiss canton of Vaud (1900-1970) increased turnout in federal
referendums by 30 percentage points.
22 Yet the context where people live is a predictor of people’s behaviours. Context matters
(Goodin & Tilly, 2006). Context affect people’s attitudes and behaviours. People living in
dominant party systems will be expected to be supplied less with democratic goods like
freedoms  and  equality  that  are  necessary  for  them  to  participate  in  elections  in
particular and in politics in general. This is because dominant parties are detrimental
to the quality of democracy (van de Walle & Buttler, 1999) and the prospects of liberal
democracy (du Toit, 1999). They pose the greatest threat to consolidation of third wave
democracies (Huntington, 1996) as they can degenerate into dominant authoritarian or
hegemonic parties. 
23 Whilst scholars have classified dominant parties by counting the effective number of
parties, this is found to be problematic and flawed (Bogaards, 2004). In this study we
use Sartori’s counting rule of dominant party meaning “the party that have secured at
least three consecutive parliamentary majorities and the presidency” (Bogaards, 2004,
p. 191). Thus, the dominant party systems in our sample are the following countries:
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
24 Access  to  news media is  another driver  of  electoral  participation.  Based on studies
suggesting that media exposure has a sizable impact on voting behaviour (Bratton et
al., 2005, p. 297; Norris, 2001; Verma & Sardesai, 2014), one would state that voters who
often access news media will be more engaged in electoral participation than others.
Due to recent development of news media, where we can distinguish traditional media3
from new news media4, different outcome could be expected: as the new news media
tends not to be regulated across the world, including in Africa, and thus with less ethics
on its  use (Martens et  al., 2018),  scholars  would expect  it  to  have more a  negative
influence than traditional ones.
25 The social structure also shapes people’s behaviours. Modernization theory suggests,
for instance, that urban dwellers will be more likely to participate in elections, as they
are more exposed to the information necessary to know the role of elections and how
society functions. In contrast, in the African context, rural residents are more likely to
vote (Bratton et al., 2005); and they do so for the ruling parties (Bratton et al., (2013, p.
92). With respect to gender, women are less likely to be interested in public affairs and
discuss politics (Afrobarometer & CPGD, 2013; Pereira et al., 2005; Shenga & Pereira,
2009),  to be represented in parliament (Shenga, 2014, p.  113) and more likely to be
victim  of  violence  (Bachman,  1994).  Although  initial  evidence  from  Afrobarometer
found no evidence of the impact of gender on voting, African women were less likely to
commune and contact (Bratton et al., 2005). 
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26 In addition to electoral participation, it is also important to review the relationship
between  the  quality  of  elections  and  democratic  consolidation,  as  the  former  has
implications  on  the  later.  The  quality  of  elections  has  an  effect  on  democratic
legitimacy. Norris (2014) found that perceived electoral integrity had a positive impact
on  satisfaction  with  democracy  while  perceived  malpractice  had  a  negative  effect
(Norris, 2014, p. 125). Greenberg and Mattes (2013) found that the perceived freeness
and  fairness  of  elections  affected  positively  the  supply  of  democracy,  indicated  by
satisfaction with democracy and the extent of democracy (p. 247). 
27 Greenberg and Mattes (2013) measured the quality of elections only by free and fair
elections; but Norris (2014) included a battery of items. For electoral integrity, she used
the following items: votes are counted fairly, election officials are fair, voters offered
genuine choice in an election, and journalists provide fair coverage of elections. For
electoral malpractices, she used: rich people buy elections, television news favours the
government party, opposition candidates are prevented from running and voters are
threatened with violence at the polls. 
 
Data and methods for explaining electoral
participation 
28 We  perform  our  analysis  and  tests  using  Afrobarometer5 public  opinion  surveys
conducted between 2016 and 2018 in 346 African countries that have made democratic
political reform7. The Afrobarometer surveys includes a set of questions on election
violence,  the  quality  of  elections,  government  performance  preventing  election
violence,  political  participation,  media  exposure,  demographics,  and  democratic
consolidation. 
29 We measure violence by using five items of which two tap electoral violence. Fear of 
election violence is indicated by the survey question: “During election campaigns in
this  country,  how  much  do  you  personally  fear  becoming  a  victim  of  political
intimidation or violence? A lot,  somewhat,  a  little  bit  or not at  all?”.  The last  four
violence items are indicated by the following questions: “… Please tell me whether, in
the  past  two  years,  you  have  ever  personally  feared  any  of  the  following  types  of
violence: 1) Violence among people in your neighbourhood or village? 2) Violence at a
political rally or campaign event? 3) Violence of public protest? 4) An armed attack by
political or religious extremists? [If yes:] Have you actually personally experienced this
type of violence in the past two years?” Reponses ranged from: no – never; yes – feared
but did not experience it; and yes – feared and experienced it.
30 In the model of electoral participation, the quality of elections is measured by trust in
the Electoral Management Body (EMB), freeness and fairness of elections, and whether
the opposition was prevented from running in elections. Trust in EMB is measured by
the following Afrobarometer question: “How much do you trust EMB?” Responses could
be given varying from not  at  all  to  just  a  little,  somewhat  and a  lot.  Freeness  and
fairness of elections is indicated by question: “On the whole, how would you rate the
freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in XXXX? Was it: not free and
fair,  free  and  fair  with  major  problems,  free  and  fair  but  with  minor  problems  or
completely free and fair?” Opposition prevented from running is measured by: “In your
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opinion, during this country’s elections, how often are opposition candidates prevented
from running for office?” Answers varied from never to sometimes, often and always.
31 But  in  the  model  of  democratic  consolidation,  the  quality  of  elections  is  boosted.
Besides  being  specified  into  considerations  that  taps  both  electoral  integrity  and
electoral  malpractice,  it  also includes the malpractices of  electoral  violence.  At this
point,  electoral  integrity  includes  measures  of  trust  in  the  EMB  and  freeness  and
fairness  of  elections;  and electoral  malpractice  includes  aspects  related to  electoral
violence covered in this study and opposition being prevented from running.
32 To  measure  government  performance  preventing  election  violence  we  use  the
following  question:  “How  well  or  badly  would  you  say  the  current  government  is
handling ‘Preventing political violence during election campaigns’? Very badly, fairly
badly, fairly well or very well?”
33 Participation after election is measured by membership in a community association
development  group;  attending  a  community  meeting,  and  participating  in  a
demonstration  or  protest  march;  joining  others  to  raise  an  issue,  and  to  request
government  action;  and  contacting  the  media,  contacting  an  official  for  help  and
contacting  officials.  Membership  in  a  community  association  development  group is
specified by: “Could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member,
an inactive member, or not a member of voluntary association or community group?” 
34 Attending a community meeting and participating in a demonstration or protest march
are  indicated  by  the  questions:  “Please  tell  me  whether  you,  personally,  have  1)
Attended a community meeting [and] 2)  Participated in a demonstration or protest
march,  during  the  past  year?”  Joining  others  to  raise  an  issue,  and  to  request
government action is specified by: “Please tell me whether you, personally, have 1) Got
together with others to raise an issue [and] 2)  Joined others in your community to
request action from government during the past year?” 
35 Contacting the media and officials for help are specified by: “Please tell me whether
you, personally, have contacted 1) the media, like calling a radio program or writing a
letter to a newspaper [and] 2) a government official to ask for help or make a complaint
during the past year?” Contacting officials is indicated by: “During the past year, how
often have you contacted: 1) A local government councillor, 2) A member of Parliament,
3) An official of a government agency, 4) A political party official, 5) Traditional leaders,
and 6) Religious leaders about some important problem or to give them your views?” 
36 Participation on election day – that  is,  voting is  measured by:  “Understanding that
some people were unable to vote in the most recent national election in XXXX, which
of the following statements is true for you? You were not registered to vote. You voted
in the elections. You decided not to vote. You could not find the polling station. You
were prevented from voting. You did not have time to vote. You did not vote because
you could not find your name in the voters’ register. You were too young to vote?”
Participation  before  election  day  is  specified  by  attending  a  campaign  rally  and
working for a candidate or party “Thinking about the last national election in XXXX,
did you: 1) Attend a campaign rally? and 2) Work for a candidate or party?” 
37 Media  exposure  is  measured  by:  “How  often  do  you  get  news  from:  1)  Radio,  2)
Television,  3)  Newspapers,  4)  Internet and 5)  Social  media? Never,  less than once a
month, a few times a month, a few times a week or every day?” Two social structure
indicators are used: residential location (rural/urban) and gender. 
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38 Democratic  consolidation  is  specified  by  three  items:  First,  support  for  democracy:
“Which  of  these  three  statements  is  closest  to  your  own  opinion? 
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. Statement 2: In
some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. Statement 3: For
someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have”. Second, extent
of democracy: “In your opinion, how much of a democracy is [COUNTRY] today?” Third,
satisfaction with democracy: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy
works  in  [COUNTRY]?”  At  public  opinion  individual  level,  democracies  consolidate
when, on the one hand, citizens demand it, saying ”democracy is preferable than any
other forms of government”, and reject authoritarian forms of government, such as:
one party rule, military rule and one-man rule. On the other hand, when they perceive
that their country is being supplied of democracy – that is, saying [COUNTRY] is a full
democracy, and they are satisfied with democracy (see Bratton et al., 2005; Greenberg &
Mattes, 2013).
39 All of these variables are measured with individual level data and they will be analysed
at  that  level.  However,  the analysis  will  be  performed at  a  multi-level  to  take into
account the contextual-country level dominant party variable that has been created
from the countries  being analysed.  Since Eswatini  does  not  have party  system,  the
number of observations drops from 34 to 33 countries.
40 We test the effect of electoral violence on electoral participation controlling for other
factors simultaneously, and then the impact of the quality of elections on democratic
consolidation,  using  binary  logistic  multiple  regression  analysis.  All  items  in  the
regression were coded 1-0. Items tapping supposedly the same thing were merged into
a single item to create a multidimensional concept or index. In order to merge them
into an index we used factor and reliability analyses8. As reliability analysis did produce
a valid reliable index for items of demand for democracy and supply of democracy, we
employ them separately. We dropped items indicating rejection of authoritarian rule to
avoid many items. 
 
Findings 
41 The effects of electoral violence on electoral participation, controlling for other factors,
are  presented  in  Table  1.  As  an  unexpected  finding,  the  results  show  that  the
malpractice  of  electoral  violence  leads  individuals  to  participate  in  elections.  All
electoral  violence  effects  are  positive.  Fear  of  violence  in  an  election  campaign  is
positive and significant on participating in an election campaign rally. It also appears
to be positive,  but not significant,  on voting. Fear of violence at a political  rally or
campaign event is positive and significant both on voting and attending an election
campaign rally. 







B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Violence       
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Perceived  fear  of  political  violence  in
an election campaign
0.05 0.04 0.10* 0.04 -0.06 0.05
Perceived  fear  of  violence  in  a
neighbourhood
-0.06 0.04 -0.14** 0.05 0.05 0.06
Perceived fear of violence at a political
rally or campaign event
0.15** 0.05 0.37*** 0.05 0.09 0.06
Perceived fear  of  violence in  a  public
protest
0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07
Perceived  fear  of  violence  by  an
extremist group
-0.20*** 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.10** 0.06
The quality of elections       
Trust EMB 0.20*** 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
Free and fair elections 0.64*** 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.28*** 0.05
Opposition prevented from running -0.24*** 0.05 -0.17** 0.06 0.18** 0.06
Government performance       
Preventing election violence 0.11** 0.03 0.13*** 0.04 -0.22*** 0.05
Country context       
Dominant party system -0.23*** 0.03 0.10** 0.04 -0.21*** 0.05
Participation after election       
Member of an association or group 0.17*** 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.35*** 0.05
Attend community meeting 0.48*** 0.04 0.51*** 0.05 0.22*** 0.06
Attend demonstration -0.42 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.27*** 0.07
Join others to raise an issue -0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.12* 0.06
Join others to request govt. action 0.24*** 0.05 0.17*** 0.05 0.08 0.05
Contact the media -0.12* 0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.22** 0.06
Contact an official for help 0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06
Contacting index 0.17*** 0.02 0.28*** 0.02 0.40*** 0.03
Participation on election day       
Voting X X 0.71*** 0.04 0.33*** 0.05
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Participation before election day       
Attend a campaign rally 0.70*** 0.04 X X 2.49*** 0.05
Work for a party /candidate 0.27*** 0.05 2.49*** 0.05 X X
Media exposure       
Radio news 0.22*** 0.04 0.27*** 0.05 -0.00 0.05
TV news -0.11** 0.04 -0.26*** 0.05 0.19** 0.05
Newspaper news 0.12** 0.05 0.10 0.05 -0.03* 0.06
Internet news -0.06 0.07 -0.25*** 0.08 -0.09 0.10
Social media news -0.45*** 0.07 0.20* 0.08 -0.20*** 0.10
Social structure       
Rural -0.01 0.04 0.21*** 0.04 0.07*** 0.05
Female -0.12*** 0.03 -0.16*** 0.04 -0.2*** 0.05
Constant -0.06 0.06 -2.48 0.08 -3.36 0.1
Nagelkerke R Square .19 .40 .43
All dependent and independent variables were coded 1 and 0. Indexes were created using factor
analysis, which extracted one single unrotated factor using Maximum Likelihood method and
reliability analysis, with Cronbach Alpha greater than .60. Items that incorporate indexes were coded
1-0 before factor and reliability analysis. 
***p=.001, **p=.01, *p=.05; 
N=44,623 individuals 18 years and older. Eswatini was removed from the analysis as it does not have
party system.
42 On  the  other  hand,  violence  in  general  has  a  significant  and  negative  effect  on
participation in elections.  Fear of  violence in a neighbourhood prevent voters from
attending election campaign rallies. Fear of violence by extremist groups reduces the
prospects of voting and working for parties or candidates. 
43 The effects of other predictors of participation in elections appear mostly to support
the  literature.  The  quality  of  elections  affects  electoral  behaviour.  As  expected,
electoral  integrity  fosters  participation  in  elections,  whereas  electoral  malpractice
reduces it. Africans who perceive that elections are free and fair tend to participate on
election day by voting and during election campaigns by attending rallies and working
for candidates or parties. Those who trust EMBs are also likely to vote. And those who
view that the opposition is prevented from running are less likely to cast a vote and
attend  a  campaign  rally.  But,  unexpectedly,  those  who view that  the opposition  is
prevented from running are likely to work for a candidate or a party.
44 The effect of government performance preventing election violence is significant on all
of the three measures of electoral participation but is, unexpectedly, negative in one.
Whilst Africans who rate positively the performance of their governments preventing
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violence during election campaign are likely to vote and attend an election campaign
rally, they are unlikely to work for a candidate or a party. 
45 Living  in  a  context  where  “the  same  party  secured  at  least  three  consecutive
parliamentary majorities and the presidency” (Bogaards, 2004) drives Africans to not
cast a vote or work for a candidate or party, as expected. However, it does not with
respect  to  attending  an  election  campaign  rally.  Africans  who  live  in  a  context  of
dominant parties are likely to attend an election campaign rally.
46 The  habit  of  participation  in  politics  in  general  tends  to  affect  participation  in
elections.  Participation  after  elections  leads  individuals  to  participate  in  elections
either on election day or during the election campaign. With only two exceptions –
contacting the media and attending a demonstration or protest march. All indicators
tapping  participation  after  election  that  are  significant  have  positive  effects.  The
negative effect of contacting the media on electoral participation could be explained by
the media highlighting negative aspects of elections. Too often the media highlights the
negative and even sometimes make the negative to appear worse (Rosenthal,  2009).
With respect to the negative effect of attending a demonstration or protest march it is
possible that those who reported attending a demonstration or protest march are more
exposed  to  news  media.  The  different  dimensions  of  electoral  participation  affect
positively one another. Those who say that they vote in elections also say that they
attend election campaign rallies and work for a candidate or party and vice versa.
47 Moving  to  news  media  consumption,  the  results  tend  to  indicate,  although  not
consistently, that traditional news media drives individuals to participate in elections
while new news media move them away from elections. Accessing radio news makes
Africans to vote and attend campaign rallies. The same applies to accessing newspaper
news on voting. Television news has mixed effects. It leads Africans to abstain from
voting and abstain from attending an election campaign rally but surprisingly it does
lead them to work for a candidate or a party. On the other hand, we observe that new
news media have negative impacts, with exception to one case. Individuals who obtain
news media from the internet are less likely to attend an election campaign rally and
those who do so through social media are less likely to vote and work for a candidate or
a party. But, unexpectedly, social media has a positive effect on attending a campaign
rally.
48 Last but not least, rural residents tend more than urban residents to attend an election
campaign and work for  a  party or  candidate.  This  might  be  explained by the high
incidences of poverty that characterize mainly rural areas in Africa. Rural dwellers may
view that there could be gains for them to participate in an election campaign rally as it
is in those periods that they may receive a free t-shirt, hat or fabrics (often promoting a
political party), watch free concerts in rallies and even receive money or basic food
stuff.  Whereas  on  election  day  they  get  “nothing”.  Note that  although  it  is  not
statistically significant, living in a rural area is negatively associated with voting. By
focusing on a subset of Round 6 of Afrobarometer surveys and using more extensive
measures of electoral participation, Shenga (2018) found that poor Africans were less
likely to vote but more likely to attend election campaign rallies, persuade others to
vote for their party or candidate and work for a party or candidate. The same trend
applies to rural residents. African females appear to be mainly disengaged in politics.
They are less likely to vote, attend an election campaign rally and work for a party or
candidate. 
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The implications of the quality of elections for
democracy
49 The effect of the quality of elections on democratic consolidation, controlling for the
context of a dominant party system, is presented in Table 2. Here, following Norris’s
model (2014) of the quality of elections, election integrity and election malpractice, we
integrate election violence measures into what we call  the quality of elections.  The
measures  of  electoral  integrity  in  our  model  are:  trust  the  EMB  and  free  and  fair
elections.  The measures of  electoral  malpractice are:  our two measures of  electoral
violence and the opposition prevented from running. 
50 The logistic regression results of the effect of the quality of elections are all significant
and continue to hold from initial  (correlation) analysis.  Election malpractice affects
negatively  dimensions  of  democratic  consolidation.  Africans  who perceive  a  fear  of
violence at a political rally or campaign event are less likely to say they live in a full
democracy and are satisfied with the way democracy is functioning in their country.
But they still view democracy as the most preferable form of government. Those who
fear violence during an election campaign rally are less likely to view that they are
being  supplied  with  democracy  in  their  countries  as  well  as  less  likely  to  support
democracy. Yet those who view that the opposition is prevented from running become
disillusioned with democracy to the extent that they do not prefer it because they view
that they are already being supplied with democracy.
51 On  the  other  hand,  electoral  integrity  affects  democratic  consolidation  positively.
Africans  who trust  the  EMB  and  rate  elections  free  and  fair  tend  more  to  prefer
democracy and to view their country as a full democracy and are satisfied with it. 
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   .009 .144 .14
All dependent and independent variables were coded 1 and 0. ***p=.001, **p=.01; 
N=44,623 individuals 18 years and older. Eswatini was removed from the analysis as it does not have
party system.
52 Africans who live in a dominant party system uncritically overrate the performance of
their political system by reporting that they tend to be satisfied with democracy. Yet,
in a dominant party system, democratic procedures of the rule of law, accountability,
participation and competition tended to be subverted by life time parties. As one would
expect, other coefficients of a dominant party system are negative but not significant. 
 
Conclusions
53 Scholarly work using a systematic approach finds that electoral violence tends to drive
Africans away from participating in elections (Bratton, 2013; Burchard, 2015). By using
the same approach, with more recent data, we found the opposite to be true. Africans
who perceived electoral violence were more likely to attend an election campaign rally
and vote. Instead of being used by the incumbent parties to prevent the opposition
supporters from turning out (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014), electoral violence in Africa
appears to motivate those who perceive it to participate more. This finding, which is
different from previous studies, is associated with the multidimensional approach to
measuring  both  electoral  violence  and  electoral  participation  and  the  use  of  more
recent dynamics of African elections. It might be also associated with the climate of
fear that persists from decades of colonial and post-colonial authoritarian rules. 
54 No less important in Africa is the effect of violence in general. Violence has a negative
effect  on participation in elections.  Africans who perceive a threat of  violence in a
neighbourhood also tended to report they do not attend election campaign rallies. And
those  who perceive  a  fear  of  violence  by  extremist  groups  tended not  to  work for
parties or candidates. If a neighbourhood is perceived to be unsafe, voters might leave
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their  residential  location  thus  losing  their  prospect  to  vote  in  the  neighbourhood
where they were registered to vote.
55 Although  this  study  points  out  that  election  violence  is  used  to  mobilize  voters
participating  in  elections,  this  malpractice  is  not  conducive  for  democratic
consolidation. Norris (2014) found that the perceived electoral integrity is associated
with system support; and Greenberg and Mattes (2013), more specifically, found that
free and fair elections is linked positively with the supply of democracy. On the other
hand, Norris (2014) found electoral malpractice is negatively associated with system
support.  This study confirms these findings.  Those who perceive the malpractice of
electoral violence are less likely to support for, and be satisfied with democracy, and
are less likely to evaluate their country as full democracy. Whilst those individuals who
perceive  the  quality  and  integrity  of  elections  are  more  likely  to  support,  and  be
satisfied with, democracy. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Afrobarometer & CPGD (Centre for Research on Governance and Development). (2013). Summary
of results. Round 5 Afrobarometer survey results in Mozambique. http://afrobarometer.org/results/
results-by-country-a-m/mozambique 
Bachman, R. (1994). Violence against women. A national crime victimization survey report. U.S.
Department of Justice. 
Bechtel, M., Hangartner, D., & Schmid, L. (2018). Compulsory voting, habit formation, and
political participation. Review of Economics and Statistics, 100(3), 467-476. 
Bekoe, D., & Burchard, S. (2017). The contradictions of pre-election violence: The effects of
violence on voter turnout in sub-Saharan Africa. African Studies Review, 60(2), 73-92. 
Bennett, S., & Bennett, L. (1986). Political participation: Meaning and measurement. In S. Long
(Ed.), Annual Review of Political Science, 1, pp. 85-103. 
Bleck, J., & Walle, N. van de. (2019). Electoral politics in Africa since 1990. Continuity in change.
Cambridge University Press. 
Boeke, D. (2012). Postelection political agreements in Togo and Zanzibar: Temporary measures
for stopping electoral violence? In D. Boeke (Ed.), Voting in fear: Electoral violence in sub-Saharan
Africa (pp. 117-144). United States Institute of Peace. 
Bogaards, M. (2004). Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa. European
Journal of Political Research, 43(2), 173-197. 
Boone, C., & Kriger, N. (2012). Land patronage and elections: Winners and losers in Zimbabwe and
Côte d’Ivoire. In D. Boeke (Ed.), Voting in fear: Electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 75-116).
United States Institute of Peace. 
Bratton, M. (2013). Vote buying and violence in Nigeria election campaigns. Electoral Studies, 27(4),
621-632. 
The Effect of Electoral Violence on Electoral Participation in Africa
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 38 | 2019
14
Bratton, M. (2015). Power politics in Zimbabwe. Lynne Rienner. 
Bratton, M., Bhavnani, R., & Chen, T.-H. (2013). Voting intentions in Africa: Ethnic, economic or
partisan? In M. Bratton (Ed.), Voting and democratic citizenship in Africa (pp. 79-100). Lynne
Rienner. 
Bratton, M., Mattes, R., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2005). Public opinion, democracy and market reform in
Africa. Cambridge University Press. 
Burchard, S. (2015). Electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Causes and consequences. Lynne Rienner. 
Blattman, C. (2009). From violence to voting: War and political participation in Uganda. American
Political Science Review, 103(2), 231-247. 
Cheeseman, N., & Klaas, B. (2018). How to rig an election. Yale University Press.
Collier, P., & Vicente, P. (2014). Votes and violence: Evidence from a field experiment in Nigeria. 
The Economic Journal, 124(574), 327-355. 
Dalton, R. (2002). Political participation. In R. Dalton, Citizens politics: Public opinion and political
parties in advanced industrial democracies (pp. 32-57) (3rd ed.). Chatham House.
Denver, D. (2007). Elections and voters in Britain (2nd ed.). Palgrave.
Fischer, J. (2002). Electoral conflict and violence: A strategy for study and prevention. IFES White Paper
2002-01. 
Goodin, R., & Tilly, C. (Eds.). (2006). The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis. Oxford
University Press.
Greenberg, A., & Mattes, R. (2013). Does the quality of elections affect the consolidation of
democracy? In M. Bratton (Ed.), Voting and democratic citizenship in Africa (pp. 239-252). Lynne
Rienner. 
Hafner-Burton, E., Hyde, S., & Jablonski, R. (2014). When do governments resort to election
violence? British Journal of Political Science, 44(1), 149-179. 
Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Penguin Books. 
Martens, B., Aguiar, L., Gómez-Herrera, E., & Mueller-Langer, F. (2018). The digital transformation of
news media and the rise of disinformation and fake news - An economic perspective. Digital Economy
Working Paper 2018-02, Joint Research Centre Technical Reports. 
Mueller, S. (2012). The political economy of Kenya’s crisis. In D. Boeke (Ed.), Voting in fear: Electoral
violence in sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 145-180). United States Institute of Peace. 
Norris, P. (2001). A virtuous circle: Political communications in postindustrial societies. Cambridge
University Press. 
Norris, P. (2014). Why electoral integrity matters. Cambridge University Press. 
Pereira, J., Rosário, D., Manuel, S., Shenga, C., & Namburete, E. (2005). Summary of results. Round 3
Afrobarometer survey results in Mozambique. 
Pintor, R. L., & Gratschew, M. (2002). Voter registration today: A gateway to enfranchisement. In
R. L. Pintor, & M. Gratschew, Voter turnout since 1945: A global report (pp. 33-36). International IDEA.
Powell, G. B. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions. Yale
University Press. 
Rosenthal, A. (2009). Engines of democracy: Politics and policymaking in state legislatures. CQ Press. 
The Effect of Electoral Violence on Electoral Participation in Africa
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 38 | 2019
15
Shenga, C. (2014). The Mozambique legislature in comparative perspective: Legislative development,
performance and legitimacy. PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, South Africa.
Shenga, C. (2018). Participação das mulheres e dos jovens no processo eleitoral na África Austral:
Da campanha eleitoral ao dia das eleições. In J. Castiano, & L. Busotti (Eds.), Participação da
juventude e das mulheres nos processos eleitorais (pp. 79-104). Oxfam. 
Shenga, C., & Howe, L. (forthcoming). Election violence in the 2019 Mozambique general election.
District level analysis. CPGD Report. 
Shenga, C., & Pereira, A. (2009). Summary of results. Round 4 Afrobarometer survey results in
Mozambique. 
Sisk, T. (2012). Evaluating election-related violence: Nigeria and Sudan in comparative
perspective. In D. Boeke (Ed.), Voting in fear: Electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 39-74).
United States Institute of Peace. 
Smith, L. (2012). A disturbance or a massacre? The consequences of violence in Ethiopia. In D.
Boeke (Ed.), Voting in fear: Electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 181-208). United States
Institute of Peace.
Straus, S., & Taylor, C. (2012). Democratization and electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa,
1990-2008. In D. Boeke (Ed.), Voting in fear: Electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 25-38).
United States Institute of Peace. 
Toit, P. du. (1999). Bridge or bridgehead? Comparing the party systems of Botswana, Namibia,
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. In H. Giliomee, & C. Simkins (Eds.), The awkward embrace: One-
party domination and democracy (pp. 193-217). Harwood. 
Verba, S., Nie, N., & Kim, J. (1978). Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison.
Cambridge University Press. 
Verma, R., & Sardesai, S. (2014). Does media exposure affect voting behaviour and political
preferences in India? Economic and Political Weekly, 49(39), 82-88. 
Walle, N. van de, & Buttler, S. (1999). Political parties and party systems in Africa’s illiberal
democracies. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 13(1), 14-28. 
NOTES
1. Afrobarometer is non-partisan, pan-African research institution conducting public
attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy and society in more than 30
countries repeated on a regular cycle. www.afrobarometer.org 
2. Round 6 has two measures of electoral violence (i.e. fear of political violence in
election campaign, and threats of violence at the polls) whilst Round 7 has three: fear of
political violence in election campaign, fear of violence at a political rally or campaign
and government performance preventing election violence. In addition, Round 7 has
three measures of violence in general.
3. This includes radio, television and newspapers.
4. This includes internet and social media (Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, etc.)
5. Afrobarometer data are available at www.afrobarometer.org. The Afrobarometer
surveyed through a face-to-face structured questionnaire nationally representative,
random, stratified probability samples of 1,200 to 2,400 ordinary African citizens –
individuals 18 years and older. The samples were drawn by taking the smallest
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geographic units, census Enumeration Areas (EAs) and stratifying all EAs across
countries into separate lists according to province and urban or rural status. From
these lists were then randomly selected 150-300 EAs with the probability proportionate
to its size in the overall population, ensuring that every eligible adult had an equal and
known chance of being selected. Eight households were then randomly selected within
each EA, and a respondent 18 years of age or older was randomly selected from each
household. A gender quota ensured that every other interview must be with a female.
6. Whilst the surveys were conducted in 34 countries only 33 countries are analysed in
this study. Eswatini was removed from the analysis as it does not have party system.
Further details follow in this section.
7. One of the prerequisites for countries to be surveyed is that they have adopted
multiparty democracy in their constitution. This is because researchers need to have
freedom to conduct research; and respondents need to air their views freely without
pressure either from the government or other agencies.
8. The factor analysis extracted one single factor using the maximum likelihood
method and reliability analysis showed internal consistency of the index of at least 60
percent.
ABSTRACTS
Systematic African studies have revealed that electoral violence tends to have a negative impact
driving Africans away from participating in elections.  However,  by using a  multidimensional
approach to electoral violence and electoral participation, combined with a recent dynamic from
the 2016 to 2018 Afrobarometer public opinion surveys of 33 African countries, this study finds
the opposite. Africans who perceived electoral violence were more likely to attend an election
campaign rally  and vote.  Instead of  being used by the  incumbent  to  prevent  the opposition
supporters  from  voting,  electoral  violence  appears  to  motivate  those  who  perceive  it  to
participate.  However,  whilst  election  violence  may  increase  electoral  participation,  this
malpractice is not conducive for consolidating democracy or fostering support for, or satisfaction
with, democracy. 
Estudos  africanos  sistemáticos  mostraram  que  a  violência  eleitoral  tende  a  ter  um  impacto
negativo, levando os africanos a não participar nas eleições. Através do uso de uma perspetiva
multidimensional  no  estudo  da  violência  eleitoral  e  participação  eleitoral,  combinado  com a
dinâmica recente dos inquéritos de opinião pública do Afrobarómetro de 2016 e 2018 de 33 países
africanos, este estudo conclui o oposto. Os africanos que perceberam violência eleitoral tendiam
mais a participar nas campanhas eleitorais e a votar. Em vez de ser usada pelo titular do poder
para impedir os apoiantes da oposição de votar, a violência eleitoral parece motivar aqueles que a
percebem a participar nas eleições. No entanto, embora a violência eleitoral possa aumentar a
participação  eleitoral,  esta  má  prática  não  é  conducente  à  consolidação  democrática  ou
promoção da, ou satisfação com, a democracia. 
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